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DANUTA MENDELSON∗
Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law provides an erudite analysis of the law of 
gifts which is impressive in its international scope. A gift is generally thought 
of as a thing given gratuitously; however, Professor Richard Hyland discusses 
much wider notions of gifts and gift-giving from historical, anthropological, 
economic, sociological, philosophical and artistic perspectives. Focusing on 
gratuitous inter vivos, as well as testamentary, transfers, he examines these 
transactions in the context of contract, restitution, property, family and 
succession laws. Hyland’s detailed comparative study encompasses not only 
the common law and several civilian European jurisdictions,
 
1
The book begins with the grand historical drama of the French Revolution, 
and the story of Marie-Jean Hérault de Séchelles (1759–1794), a young 
lawyer born into an eminent noble family of the ancien régime. In 1785, at the 
 but also the 
Roman law and non-European law. His knowledge of languages allows the 
author not only to translate the relevant law, but also to note semantic, 
historical and cultural nuances associated with the relevant legal terminology 
and expression.  
                                                 
∗ Chair in Law (Research), School of Law, Deakin University. 
1 Jurisdictions which have civil codes derived, often rather indirectly, from the Roman law. 
They include Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium.   
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age of 26, he was made Attorney-General to the Parlement of Paris, which at 
the time had both judicial and legislative powers. However, in 1789 de 
Séchelles was disinherited because of his early and passionate involvement 
with the revolution. (In pre-revolutionary France, under the system of 
primogeniture, which governed the law of succession for the nobility, the 
eldest son inherited the entire estate, to the exclusion of younger siblings. 
Amongst the peasants and the middle class, on the other hand, a father had an 
absolute right to choose his heir (not necessarily the eldest son), and leave 
very little to the other children. During the period of the French Revolution, in 
1792, de Séchelles was elected to the legislative assembly and then the 
National Convention. He was deeply involved in drafting the decree of 7 
March 1793, by which the National Convention abolished ‘the power to make 
gratuitous transfers to direct descendants, whether mortis causa, inter vivos, or 
by contractual gift’, thus giving all descendants ‘an equal right in the division 
of the property of their ascendants’.2
In 1800, after the French Revolution, laws prohibiting parents from giving or 
willing gifts to their children, and their effects, were retracted or substantially 
amended under the Directory. However, Hyland notes that the revolutionary 
provisions serve as an excellent illustration of the Western law’s distrust of 
gift-giving, a distrust that has its sources in the Roman Law (lex Cincia of 204 
BCE).
 Moreover, by Decree of 17 Nivôse, all 
gifts which had the effect of prejudicing the presumptive heirs were made 
invalid with retroactive operation to July 1789. And then, two months later, 
all inter vivos gifts were retroactively voided to 1789. These laws, though 
made in the name of equality, had a collateral effect of restoring Hérault de 
Séchelles’ inheritance. Hérault did not live to enjoy his fortune, however, for, 
on 5 April 1794, accused of treason, he was tried before the Revolutionary 
Tribunal, condemned, and guillotined. 
3
the policy foundation for … [an] eighteenth century formulation of the law 
of gifts, the substance of which passed into the French Civil Code and 
ultimately into the laws of Europe and most of the civilian world.
 The distrust of gift-giving became: 
4
Hyland argues that the distrust is unfounded and supplies his own vision of 
what the law of gifts, particularly, inter vivos gifts, should be. Chapter 1 
involves the reader in a wide-ranging and insightful discussion on the nature, 
custom, and communal and political status of gift-offering and gift-receiving. 
  
                                                 
2 Richard Hyland, Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 4 n 21.  
3 Ibid 7. 
4 Ibid. 
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In Chapter 2 he sets out the methodology of comparative law, and explains 
how it guides his analysis.   
Chapter 3, ‘The Legal Concept of the Gift’, forms the centerpiece of the book 
insofar as the following four Chapters (‘Gift Capacity’; ‘The Gift Promise’; 
‘Making the Gift’ and ‘Revocation’) are devoted to detailed comparative 
descriptions of the ways in which different jurisdictions approach and define 
the requirements for valid gift disposition. In the final chapter, ‘The Place of 
the Gift’ Hyland discusses the question of whether the institution of gift-
giving should be characterised as contract (as in, for example, Germany, 
France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and other civilian countries), an aspect of 
property law (as in the common law countries), or an autonomous legal 
institution with its own, uniquely matched, norms.  
When analysing the legal concept of the gift, Hyland notes that ‘a systematic 
[legal] definition of gift is hard to find’5
1. ‘gratuitousness’ (no expectation of consideration);  
 because, rather than defining the legal 
constituents of the gift, the law tends to focus on the process of gift-giving — 
the requirements for its valid execution or disposition. He adopts four 
definitional elements of the gift:  
2. ‘the subjective element’ (whether the donor had a subjective intent 
to donate, either by donative intent or by an agreement between the 
parties that the transaction will be gratuitous);  
3. ‘an inter vivos transfer’ (a transfer that takes place during the 
donor’s lifetime, by contrast with a testamentary disposition); and  
4. ‘the gift object’ (at common law, any alienable real or personal, 
corporeal or incorporeal property, as well as assignable choses in 
action can be subjects of gift; in civilian jurisdictions the gift object 
tends to include such patrimonial rights as ‘ownership rights (droits 
réels) of both movable and immovable property’).6
Any lawyer from a common law system would raise an eyebrow at the 
absence of a serious discussion relating to the requirements of (1) the donor 
having to be of sound mind; and (2) the donor’s intention to donate being 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid 127. 
6 Ibid 135ff.  
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voluntary, and free of coercion.7
Siebert’s approach still governs German law, and has been very influential in 
other civil law systems. Of the civilian countries discussed by Hyland, only 
Argentina actually specifies in addition that a gift transfer must be voluntary.
 However, these requirements were not 
among the elements of the gift as initially articulated by the German jurist, 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861). Likewise, they are conspicuously 
missing from the legal definition articulated by Wolfgang Siebert, who 
elaborated Savigny’s ideas. Hyland adopts Siebert’s description of three 
principal requirements that make inter vivos gifts valid, namely: (1) 
‘disposition (Zuwendung) that both enriches the donee’s patrimony and 
impoverishes that of the donor’; (2) the gratuitous (unentgeltlich) nature of the 
disposition, and (3) the acceptance by the donee of ‘the disposition and its 
gratuitous character’.  
8
Richard Hyland briefly refers to freedom of compulsion in the context of the 
Roman understanding of generosity, and cites Italian jurists who argue that 
‘any sort of compulsion, whether physical or moral’, and any ‘transaction 
designed to satisfy a preexisting moral or social duty is compelled’
  
9 and 
cannot coexist with gratuitousness. However, he considers that this ‘approach 
operates with a conception of freedom that cannot be reconciled with the 
conventional experience of gift’.10
It is a great pity that Hyland does not place the formulation by Siebert of the 
legal elements of a gift in its historical context. For Wolfgang Siebert (1905-
1959)
 Well, this depends on one’s view about 
whether the law of gifts should include protection of vulnerable donors from 
donees who are in the position of power in the relationship.  
11 was a Nazi Party12
                                                 
7 For example, undue influence is mentioned in relation to guardian and ward; physician- 
patient; priest-penitent, and lawyer-client relationships (Chapter 6 (‘Making the Gift’)) but not 
in relation to donees and donors. Hyland argues that there is no need to have general laws 
safeguarding donors against undue influence because the law already does so for donors who 
are in guardian–ward, physician–patient, priest–penitent, and lawyer–client relationships 
(Chapter 6 (‘Making the Gift’)). 
 member from at least 1933, and one of the legal 
8 Ibid 130. 
9 Ibid 145. 
10 Ibid 145. 
11Wolfgang Siebert (1 November 2010) Wikipedia <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_ 
Siebert>. 
12 Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei [National Socialist German Workers’ Party].  
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theorists of National Socialism.13 He was active in re-casting private law in 
the light of the Nazi Party policies. For example, on 12 and 13 October 1935, 
at a conference of the University Teachers’ Section of the Federation of 
National Socialist German Lawyers,14 Siebert voted in favour of a resolution 
against legal equality. It called for the replacement of the legal terms ‘human’ 
and ‘natural person’ within the meaning of article 1 of the German Civil Code 
(BGB) with racially defined concepts. According to the resolution, these two 
terms ‘obscured and falsified the differences that existed between members of 
the German Volk, citizens of the German Reich, Jews and so forth’.15 The 
resolution followed the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour 
and the Reich Citizenship Law (Nürnberger Gesetze) of 15 September 1935, 
which deprived Jews of citizenship, the right to marry, or be married to, 
Aryans16 and to work in any professional capacity.17
Siebert served as a judge of the Nazi Supreme Labour Court between 1933 
and 1945.
  
18 This court was described by Taylor Cole in 1941 as having 
undergone ‘a fundamental change in the character of the judicial personnel’19
                                                 
13 See for example G Dahm, E R Huber and W Siebert et al, Grundfragen der neuen 
Rechtswissenschaft (Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1935); Wilhelm Reuß and Wolfgang Siebert, Die 
konkrete Ordnung des Betriebes (Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1941). 
 
in the wake of the 1933 election, and the enactment of the 
Ermächtigungsgesetz [Enabling Act], which formally ushered in Hitler’s 
dictatorship. In particular Cole writes that:  
14 <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_Siebert>. In 1936 it became the Federation of 
Defenders of the Law (Rechtswahrerbund), also known as the National Socialist Lawyers’ 
Federation. 
15 Otto Dov Kulka (ed), Deutsches Judentum unter dem Nationalsozialismus, vol 1: Dokumente 
zur Geschichte der Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden 1933-1939 (Mohr Siebeck, 1997) 
591. On the conference see Christoph Müller, ‘Das Freund-Feind-Theorem Carl Schmitts’ in 
Gegen Barbarei: Essays Robert W Kempner zu Ehren (Athenäum, 1989) 168f.  
16 For example, Wolfgang Siebert, Das Recht der Familie und die Rechtsstellung des 
Volksgenossen: Systematische Gesetzessammlung (Die Rechtsstellung des Juden) (Deutscher 
Rechtsverlag, 1939) (several ‘updated’ editions appeared throughout the the 2nd World War). 
17 For example, Wolfgang Siebert, Das deutsche Arbeitsrecht: Sammlung der 
arbeitsrechtlichen Bestimmungen mit Einleitung, Vorbemerkungen und Hinweisen 
(Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938); Wolfgang Siebert, Das Recht der Arbeit: Systematische 
Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten arbeitsrechtlichen Vorschriften (Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 
1941); Carl Birkenholz and Wolfgang Siebert, Der ausländische Arbeiter in Deutschland: 
Sammlung und Erläuterung der arbeits- und sozialrechtlichen Vorschriften über das 
Arbeitsverhältnis nichtvolksdeutscher Beschäftigter (Verlag für Wirtschaftsschrifttum, 1942). 
18 Michael Stolleis, ‘Gemeinschaft und Volksgemeinschaft: Zur juristischen Terminologie im 
Nationalsozialismus’ (1972) 20 Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 16. 
19 Taylor Cole, ‘National Socialism and the German Labor Courts’ (1941) 3(2) The Journal of 
Politics 169, 174. The laws to guarantee the political reliability of judges were derived from: 
Reichsgesetzbuch 1 (RGB l) (1933), vol 1, 175 and RGB 1 (1937), vol 1, 39. 
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A new type of partisan whose Party loyalty cannot be questioned now fills 
the judicial positions. This was made possible in part by the systematic 
purging of “non-Aryans” and of those who showed evidences of lack of 
conformity. The judiciary, in the language of National Socialists, was 
“gradually purified.”20
The bailiwick of the Nazi Labour Courts included some 12 million slave 
labourers in the labour camps for ‘unreliable elements’ (unzuverlässige 
Elemente), and in the extermination camps.
   
21
Siebert’s chapter on ‘Schenkung’ [Gift] was published in the 
Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch für das Zivil- und Handelsrecht des 
In- und Auslandes [Handbook of Comparative Civil & Commercial Law], vol 
6: 144–159. This Handbook series appeared in Berlin (published by Franz 
Vahlen) between 1927 and 1938, and was edited by Franz Schlegelberger.
  
22 
Schlegelberger was the highest-ranking defendant at the Nuremberg trial 
(known as the Justice Trial) of members of the Reich Ministry of Justice as 
well as members of People’s and Special Courts.23
                                                 
20 Cole, above n 19, 174. 
 He was convicted of war 
21 Cole, ibid, 197 n108, notes that ‘Wolfgang Siebert [Das Arbeitsverhältnis in der Ordnung 
der nationalen Arbeit (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935)] has maintained that the basis of 
the labor relationship lies not in the contract of employment but in the joining of the 
“workshop community”. In other words, within the employer–employee relationship the 
element of consent was subsumed by the element of ‘community’. See also Marc Linder, The 
Supreme Labor Court in Nazi Germany: A Jurisprudential Analysis (V Klostermann, 1987); 
Wolf Gruner, Jewish Forced Labor under the Nazis: Economic Needs and Racial Aims, 1938-
1944 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
22 In 1927 Schlegelberger was appointed Ministerial Director in the German Reich Ministry of 
Justice and became Secretary of State in the Reich Ministry of Justice in 1931. In 1941 he was 
put in charge of the Reich Ministry of Justice as Administrative Secretary of State, a position 
which he held until 1942: <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/ 
alstoetter.htm#Schlegelberge>. According to Matthew Lippman (‘The Prosecution of Josef 
Altstoetter et al: Law, Lawyers and Justice in the Third Reich’ (1997–1998) 16(2) Dickinson 
Journal Of International Law 343, 399), Schlegelberger ‘also harbored intellectual 
aspirations: publishing, teaching and lecturing at home and abroad on commercial, 
comparative and family law’.  
23 Franz Schlegelberger (17 November 2010) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_ 
Schlegelberger>; The Nuremberg Trials: The Justice Trial including complete trial transcripts 
at University of Missouri, Famous Trials <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm#Schlegelberge>. See also Ingo Műller, Hitler’s 
Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans, Harvard University 
Press, 1991) [trans of Furchtbare Juristen (first published 1989)]; Michael Stolleis, The Law 
under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany (T Dunlap trans, University of 
Chicago Press, 1998); Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of 
Law in Europe. The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal 
Traditions (with a prologue by Michael Stolleis and an epilogue by J H H Weiler (Hart 
Publishing, 2003).   
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crimes as well as crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
One of his criminal acts was the drafting of the Decree on Penal Law for 
Poles and Jews of December 4, 1941, which essentially deprived Poles and 
Jews of all substantive rights under criminal law.24
The Tribunal thus described ‘the national pattern or plan for racial 
extermination’ in which, both Siebert and Schlegelberger were implicated:  
  
Fundamentally, the program was one for the actual extermination of Jews 
and Poles, either by means of killing or by confinement in concentration 
camps, which merely made death slower and more painful. But lesser forms 
of racial persecution were universally practiced by governmental authority 
and constituted an integral part in the general policy of the Reich. We have 
already noted the decree by which Jews were excluded from the legal 
profession. Intermarriage between Jews and persons of German blood was 
prohibited. Sexual intercourse between Jews and German nationals was 
punished with extreme severity by the courts. By other decrees Jews were 
almost completely expelled from public service, from educational 
institutions, and from many business enterprises. Upon the death of a Jew 
his property was confiscated. Under the provisions for confiscation under 
the 11th amendment to the German Citizenship Law … the decision as to 
confiscation of the property of living Jews was left to the Chief of the 
Security Police and the SD. The law against Poles and Jews … (4 December 
1941), was rigorously enforced.25
It is against this historical background that one would have expected the 
author to examine whether Siebert and his editor, Schlegelberger, had any 
reasons for excluding voluntariness and freedom from coercion from the 
requirements for legally valid gifts. Richard Hyland has adopted Siebert’s 
principles as the centrepiece of his book. The question arises of why, given 
the date of their publication, their author and editor, he did not repeat the 
pattern of historical, political and economic analysis so aptly used in the case 
of Marie-Jean Hérault de Séchelles. Whatever the answer is, the failure to 
consider these factors detracts from the persuasive force of the subsequent 
arguments. 
  
Hyland concludes his massive study with an idealistic ‘new vision’ and a 
prediction that: (1) the ‘outmoded’ legal regimes, which at present regulate 
                                                 
24 The Nuremberg Trials: The Justice Trial including complete trial transcripts at University of 
Missouri, Famous Trials <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/ 
alstoetter.htm#Schlegelberge>. 
25 The Nuremberg Trials: The Justice Trial including complete trial transcripts at University of 
Missouri, Famous Trials <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/ 
alstoetter.htm>. 
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gift-giving, will reduce their protections of donors, including the protection 
afforded by the requirement of gift-making capacity, not only in terms of 
sound mind, but also voluntariness;26 (2) forms will be created to simplify the 
rules by which gift promises are made; and at common law ‘exceptions to the 
consideration doctrine will reach beyond detrimental reliance to permit the 
enforcement of all gift promises that are sincerely meant’; (3) the courts will 
enforce seriously intended promises, even where they lack the required 
formality.27
According to Hyland: 
 Indeed, except in specific circumstances, for example safe 
harbour provisions and transfers of real estate, formalities will no longer 
remain a precondition to a valid execution of a gift.  
The legal recognition of a valid gift will henceforth depend on a finding of 
clear donative intent. There are two aspects of this intent. The donor must 
have intended, first, that the transfer was to be gratuitous, and, second, that 
the transfer was to operate immediately. A gift completed in the prescribed 
forms will satisfy this proof. Satisfying the traditional delivery requirement 
will also offer relevant evidence. If the forms have not been employed, the 
courts will evaluate all of the facts and the circumstances. The role of the 
courts will be to determine whether a gift was actually intended and made.28
Hyland also envisages that  
 
The law will no longer intervene to revoke executed gifts. Some argue that 
the institution is already in decline ... Tort law provides remedies for most 
civil wrongs. Revocation due to the birth of a child has been so roundly 
criticized that the latest French code revision greatly restricted it. 
Revocation for impoverishment will be unnecessary as social services 
become more widely available. The goal will instead be to guarantee the 
legal security of executed gifts.29
There are two fundamental problems with Hyland’s vision of the new law of 
gifts. The first again concerns the absence of the requirement of voluntariness 
and freedom from coercion. Intention is not the same as voluntariness.
  
30
                                                 
26 According to Hyland, above n 2, 594, ‘Capacity rules will be simplified to coincide with the 
capacity rules for other legal acts’. 
 In 
27 Hyland posits that, since ‘the courts in most systems now base their decisions on all of the 
facts and circumstances of the case … [they] should be permitted to do so explicitly’: ibid 
593. 
28 Ibid 594. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Hyland admits that ‘Donative intent has proved especially difficult to define’, and notes that 
‘a finding of donative intent may often depend on whether it is possible to create a convincing 
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Germany during the 1930s, Jewish owners of businesses,31 shops, 
manufacturing plants, apartments, bicycles, or a packet of cigarettes were 
often faced with a choice between beating, arrest or extermination on the one 
hand, and ‘gifting’ their goods, property and choses in action to individual 
Aryans or to the Reich officials on the other.32 Irwin Cotler33 has described 
the system of ‘the Aryanization or confiscation of Jewish property without 
compensation and its transfer to Aryan hands (ie, Nazi loyalists) on pain of 
imprisonment for refusal’,34 which operated from 193835 in Austria (where the 
archival material is most extensive).36
The Jewish ‘donors’ would have evidenced ‘a clear donative intent’ as well as 
Hyland’s other three requirements for a legally secure, executed ‘gift’. 
Arguments based on the experience of the Third Reich are sometimes 
dismissed as inapplicable to modern times; however, good law is not made for 
   
                                                                                                                    
narrative about the donor’s motivations’: ibid 149, 150. A sceptic would comment that such a 
criterion would be a gift to some donees — liars, bullies and those who, having preyed on the 
vulnerable donors, can employ the best lawyers (ie, those able to concoct the most convincing 
stories about the donor’s motivations): ibid 149. 
31 The Deutsche Bank, for example, between 1936 and 1938, ‘aryanised’ through confiscation 
363 Jewish businesses: Harold James, The Nazi Dictatorship and the Deutsche Bank 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
32 Frank Bajohr, ‘Aryanisation’ in Hamburg: The Economic Exclusion of Jews and the 
Confiscation of Their Property in Nazi Germany in Monographs in German History, vol 7 
(George Wilke trans, Berghahn Books, 2002) [trans of ‘Arisierung’ in Hamburg: Die 
Verdrängung der judischen Unternehmer 1933-45 (first published 1997)]; Frank Bajohr, 
‘Book Review of The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews: The 
Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property by Harold James (Cambridge University Press, 
2001)’ (2003) 108(1) The American Historical Review 277–8; Beate Meyer, Hermann Simon, 
and Chana Schütz, Jews in Nazi Berlin: From Kristallnacht to Liberation (University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), particularly Part 3 ‘Aryanization’, which describes the process based on 
the case study of the Garbáty family.  
33 Irwin Cotler, ‘The Holocaust, Thefticide, and Restitution: A Legal Perspective’ (1998) 20 
Cardozo Law Review 601. 
34 Ibid 606 citing Itamar Levine, The Fate of Stolen Jewish Properties: The Cases of Austria 
and the Netherlands (Institute of the World Jewish Congress, Policy Study No 8, 1997, 5). 
35 According to Cotler, above n 33, 604, ‘The Aryanization of Jewish property was buttressed 
by forced property declarations in which Austrian Jews, on pain of fine or imprisonment, 
were ordered to report “their agricultural property, forest holdings, immovables, business and 
industrial property, professional practices, securities, uncollected debts, savings, bank 
deposits, life insurance policies, pensions, annuities, jewelry, artworks, precious metals and 
stones, copyrights, etc.”’ In 1938, there were documented approximately ‘25,000 cases of 
Aryanization, including eighty percent of the businesses owned by Jews ... In 1940 the 
Germans evaluated the value of Austrian Jewish private property at $1.5 billion in nominal 
value; in current terms, the figure surpasses $15 billion. These figures do not include 
communal property and real estate’: at 604. 
36 The documents are housed in the National Archives in Vienna.  
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fair weather. And unfortunately, although conditions for Jews and other non-
Aryans under the Third Reich were extreme, there have always been, are, and 
will be corrupt regimes and private circumstances under or in which 
vulnerable donors with ostensibly donative intentions in fact execute their 
‘gifts’ under pressure. This is why, at least since the Roman lex Cincia, the 
law has inserted procedural safeguards aimed at protecting the vulnerable. 
The second problem with Hyland’s vision or proposal involves the principle 
of the coherence of the law. If executed gifts carried a guarantee of legal 
security, then, by definition, the law of Torts (or any other law) would be 
powerless to intervene. Such guarantee would have the effect of subverting 
‘many other principles of law, and statutory provisions, which strike a balance 
of rights and obligations, duties and freedoms’.37
To sum up, the book is a very impressive work of great scholarship — albeit 
one espousing debatable views — which, to borrow from its author’s 
concluding comments,
  
38
 
 provides the reader with ‘an intricate and instructive 
tapestry of comparative law’ relating to gifts.  
                                                 
37 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan 
JJ) 576 [42]. 
38 Hyland, above n 2, 595. 
